Equal Educational Opportunity for the Handicapped—An Unfulfilled Promise by Black, Ralph & Coyne, Lisa
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1979
Equal Educational Opportunity for the
Handicapped—An Unfulfilled Promise
Ralph Black
Lisa Coyne
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ralph Black & Lisa Coyne, Equal Educational Opportunity for the Handicapped—An Unfulfilled Promise, 12 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 683
(1979).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol12/iss3/2
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR THE
HANDICAPPED-AN UNFULFILLED PROMISEr
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the handicapped have been either entirely excluded
from education or provided with an education inappropriate or inade-
quate to meet their needs.' In recent years, this situation has attracted
some attention, and efforts have been made to afford the handicapped
equal educational opportunity. This comment will first trace the judi-
cial and legislative developments in this area on the federal level. Once
the scope of the law on the federal level has been defined, the real issue
becomes: how should the states respond to the federal mandates in
providing education to the handicapped? Therefore, this comment will
next focus on the approach that has been followed in California. When
the positive and negative aspects of the California experience have
been explored, some conclusions will be drawn about how states should
and should not deal with the education of their handicapped citizens.
Reforms in the education of disabled children in grades kindergarten
through twelve were made in response to several specific criticisms of
the special education system. First, in the past, many disabled children
were completely excluded from any form of education.2 Second, in the
present, children who do not need special education are often assigned
to such programs because of improper identification procedures,' while
students who need special help are overlooked.4 Third, the type of in-
t Copyright 0 1979 Ralph Black & Lisa Coyne.
1. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, 4 History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualpfcations of Handi-
capped Persons as a "Suspect Class" under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 855, 875 (1975) [hereinafter cited as History of Unequal Treatment]. There are approxi-
mately seven million school age children requiring special education, of whom one million
receive no formal education. Only 50% of the remainder receive special education. Id.
2. Id.
3. Regular classroom teachers identify students who are aberrant and recommend them
for testing and special placement. Kirp, Buss, & Kuriloff, Legal'Reform of Special Educa-
tion: Empirical Studies and ProceduralProposals, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 103 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Legal Reform]. In addition, "definitions of what is tolerable deviation from
expected behavior vary markedly from teacher to teacher." Id. The use of culturally biased
tests, id. at 50, and teacher selection lead to the overrepresentation of boys, the aggressive,
and the nonwhite in special education programs. Id. at 44.
4. The selection system "may lead the school both to ignore the special needs of students
who do not disrupt the classroom and to underestimate the educational potential of minority
students." Id.
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structional setting selected for a disabled student is often inappropri-
ate.' Finally, the very act of labeling a child as "disabled" and placing
him or her in a separate program has a stigmatizing effect6 and often
produces an education of inferior quality.7
On the postsecondary level, outright or de facto exclusion remains a
problem, although the concerns are somewhat different. One primary
area of difficulty for handicapped students is that of obtaining physical
access to campus facilities. This involves the removal of architectural
barriers,8 as well as providing attendants or other assistance where
modification is impossible.9 As to academic programs, one concern is
that the requirements for admission' ° and obtaining a degree" be non-
discriminatory. In addition, disabled students require special equip-
ment and services in order to make academic and other campus
programs truly accessible. 2
II. DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY
A threshold question involves determining what people with mental
or physical abnormalities should be called. The most traditional and
common answer has been that these people are "handicapped." But
some people have become concerned that this label implies limitation
and lack of ability. This concern has given rise to the use of a variety of
terms such as "inconvenienced," "special," "exceptional," and "dis-
abled." Because these labels seem to be fruits of a pointless search for
the right euphemism, the authors have decided to use the terms "handi-
capped" and "disabled" interchangeably throughout this comment.
Once a label has been attached to the population in question, one
must next determine how to define that term. Early attempts to define
5. Comment, Public Instruction to the Learning Disabled- Higher Hurdles for the Handi-
capped, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 113, 121 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Higher Hurdles].
6. Jones, Labels and Sti'ma in SpecialEducation, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 553, 560-61
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Labels and Stigma].
7. "[D]espite the additional resources in special programs, special classes generally have
either no effect or a slightly adverse effect on both the motivation and achievement of stu-
dents assigned to them." Legal Reform, supra note 3, at 44.
8. California State University and Colleges, Task Force on Disabled Students 6-7 (Dec.
1974).
9. "For example, if a physically disabled person requires assistance to get in and out of
his/her vehicle or to use restroom facilities, then such services are necessary to give that
student access to the educational programs and facilities." Disabled Students Coalition, Po-
sition Paper. The Application of Section 504 to Higher Education 2-3 (Aug. 15, 1978) [here-
inafter cited as DSC Position Paper].
10. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.42 (1977).
11. See, e.g., id. § 84.44.
12. Id.
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the handicapped focused on medical definitions of disability. 13 The
more modem approach defines disability in functional terms.' 4 An ad-
vantage of definitions that are either wholly or partly functional is that
they de-emphasize the use of specific labels which can lead to stigmati-
zation of the handicapped individual. 5 The drawback of functional
definitions is that they tend to be vague and difficult to apply in actual
practice. Despite this disadvantage, this comment will adopt the defini-
tions provided in the federal law,' 6 because these are the definitions
which presumably will be accepted throughout the country for most
purposes in the future.
III. ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
A. Federal Law
1. Judicial Interpretations
Education has traditionally been thought of as purely a state func-
tion. For this reason, federal courts have been reluctant to hear chal-
lenges to state practices regarding the education of'the disabled. 7
However, some federal courts have been willing to hear such cases and
have thus established the basis for the development of judicial doctrine
in this area.'8 The courts have been asked to resolve several major
issues to be explored separately in the following text.
a. Is there a constitutional right to education?
The starting point for much of the litigation concerning the field of
education is the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education.'9
13. "Handicapped students are persons with ... [a professionally] verified physical, com-
munication or learning disability." California Community Colleges, Operational Guideline:
Programs for the Handicapped 2.3 (Fall 1977).
14. 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(1) (1977) provides: "'Handicapped persons' means any person
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major
life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1978) provides:
The term "handicapped children" means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf,
speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically
impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with specific learning disabili-
ties, who by reason thereof require special education and related services.
15. See Labels and Stigma, supra note 6.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. Higher Hurdles, supra note 5, at 124.
18. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (court refused to abstain even though state statutes unclear and uninter-
preted by state courts).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1979]
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In Brown, the United States Supreme Court held that education is such
an important function that, if a state has undertaken to provide it, edu-
cation must be made available to all citizens on an equal basis.20 While
this decision did not dictate an absolute and constitutionally guaran-
teed right to education, it did have an analogous effect for all states
have undertaken to provide education. In a subsequent and definitive
opinion, Rodriguez v. San Antonio School District,2 the Court specifi-
cally held that the United States Constitution does not guarantee edu-
cation as a fundamental right.22 The Court, however, did imply that
there may be some minimum level of education, which can be consid-
ered fundamental, because it is necessary for the meaningful exercise of
other rights that are guaranteed.23
Advocates for disabled children have attempted to use the concept of
a right to education to prevent the exclusion of such children from pub-
licly supported education. The first major case to take this approach
was Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Penn-
sylvania.24 The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children
brought suit in district court on behalf of thousands of school-age men-
tally retarded children who had been totally excluded from public edu-
cation because they were believed to be incapable of benefiting from
education. The court never reached the constitutional question but
did approve a consent decree that insured the right to a publicly sup-
ported education for all disabled children and established procedural
safeguards to protect this right.26 In Mills v. Board of Education,27 the
district court for the District of Columbia also found a right to educa-
tion that prevented continued exclusion of disabled children.28 Al-
20. Id. at 493. Several cases have reached conclusions similar to that in Brown. See, e.g.,
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 875 (D. Minn. 1971) (education a "truly funda-
mental" interest); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 766-68, 557 P.2d 929, 951, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345, 366 (1976) (education a fundamental interest); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d, 457,
468-69 (Mich. 1972) (education a fundamental interest under state constitution); Robinson v.
Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 213 (N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (free education a state
function).
21. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
22. Id. at 35.
23. Id. at 35-36.
24. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
25. Id. at 281-82.
26. Id. at 302-03.
27. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
28. "The court need not belabor the fact that requiring parents to see that their children
attend school under pain of criminal penalties presupposes that an educational opportunity
will be made available to the children. The Board of Education is required to make such
opportunity available." Id. at 874.
[Vol. 12
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though statutory developments 29 have eliminated the necessity for
reliance on this judicially created right to education, it seems reason-
able to assume that this precedent remains viable despite the Rodriguez
decision, at least in an instance of total exclusion.
b. What does equality of education mean?
Even in the absence of an absolute right to education, Brown seems
to require that whatever education that is provided must be provided
equally.30 However, a major definitional question arises when an at-
tempt is made to measure equality of education. In Mclnnis v. Sha-
piro,3 1 a federal court rejected the contention that equality of education
means equal expenditures.32 But the Mclnnis court also rejected the
idea that equality of education means expenditures based on pupils'
needs, because this standard is unduly vague.33 Another standard that
has been suggested defines equality of education as maximizing the po-
tential of all students.34 In the Rodrg'uez decision the Supreme Court
came very close to resolving these conflicting concepts of equality by
condoning the Texas system that allocated resources differentially.
35
Thus, at least beyond some minimum level, equality of expenditures or
inputs does not seem to be required by the Federal Constitution.
c. Should the disabled be afforded equal educational opportunity?
As already indicated, the disabled have been held entitled to some
form of publicly supported education.36 Once the disabled are part of
the student population, the issue becomes whether or not they should
be afforded equality of educational opportunity, and if so, in what
manner.
Most challenges to discriminatory treatment within the educational
system have been based on the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment 37 and the 1964 Civil Rights Act.38 Thus, a key issue
29. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 493.
31. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il. 1968), a'dper cur/am, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
32. Id. at 335.
33. Id. at 335-36.
34. Tesser & Stodolsky, Equal Opportunity for Maximum Development, HARV. ED. REV.
126, 134 (1969).
35. 411 U.S. at 28.
36. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
37. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1: "No State shall.. . deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws. .. .
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
is whether the disabled should be treated as a suspect class for the pur-
pose of applying the equal protection clause. If the disabled are found
to be a suspect class, then strict judicial scrutiny is required and une-
qual treatment can be justified only by the existence of a compelling
state interest in such treatment.3 9 Absent suspect class status, the state
is free to treat the disabled differently as long as there is some rational
basis for such a scheme.4°
In 1974, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided In re G.H.,41 one
of the first cases to regard the disabled as a suspect class requiring the
use of strict judicial scrutiny.42 In 1975, in Fialkowski v. Schap,43 the
district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated that the
disabled ought to qualify as a suspect class. 4 A year later the same
court developed this analysis further by stating that the plaintiffs in
Fredrick L. v. Thomas45 had some of the characteristics of a suspect
class, such as minority status and political weakness.46 In view of these
decisions, it seems likely, though not certain,4 7 that the disabled qualify
as a suspect class for purposes of applying the equal protection clause.
One approach to challenging inadequate education has been to claim
that it amounts to constructive exclusion. This theory seems to have
been first employed in an educational setting in Lau v. Nichols," where
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
39. History of Unequal Treatment, supra note 1, at 900-01.
40. Id. at 901.
41. 218 N.W. 2d 441 (N.D. 1974) (school district held responsible for continuing payment
of handicapped child's educational expenses even though child had been declared a ward of
state).
42. Id. at 447.
We are confident that the [Supreme Court] would have held that G.H.'s terrible handi-
caps were just the sort of "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth" to which the "inherently suspect" classification would be applied, and ... would
be the sort of denial of equal protection which has been held unconstitutional in cases
involving discrimination based on race and illegitimacy and sex.
43. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
44. Id. at 959 (dictum) (retarded children meet several indicia of strict scrutiny test: pre-
cluded from political process; neglected by state legislatures; stigmatized).
45. 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976), af'd, 557 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977).
46. Id. at 836. However, the court specifically found that the handicapped children were
not members of a suspect class meriting strict scrutiny, but instead suggested that "the
Supreme Court. . .would apply the.. . middle test of equal protection, sometimes re-
ferred to as 'strict rationality'." Id.
47. See Brewer & Armstrong, Is the Constitution Handicapped?, 14 TRIAL, June 1978, at
52 [hereinafter cited as Is the Constitution Handicapped?!. See also History of Unequal Treat-
ment, supra note 1.
48. 414 U.S. 563 (1973).
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students of Chinese ancestry were held to have been constructively ex-
cluded from education by placement in classes taught only in English.4 9
The plaintiffs in both Fialkowski and Fredrick L. applied this theory in
an effort to strike down educational schemes that provided the disabled
with inadequate or inappropriate education.
5 1
The primary defense of many school systems against providing edu-
cation for the disabled is that of limited financial resources."' But, in
Mills, lack of funds was held to be an insufficient justification for ex-
clusion or inappropriate placement of disabled children. 2 The Mills
decision clearly indicated that if a school district does not have suffi-
cient funds to provide optimum education for all, it must nevertheless
distribute those funds available in a fashion that insures disabled stu-
dents equal educational opportunity.53 Unfortunately, the soundness
of this holding is now somewhat questionable for Rodriguez subse-
quently held that differential funding is permissible as long as all stu-
dents are provided with some minimally necessary education.
5 4
There are reasons, however, for not applying the Rodriguez analysis
to the disabled. Rodriguez assumes that all children will receive some
minimal education (which is not true for many disabled children) and
that this minimal level of education will be sufficient to give all chil-
dren the basic skills they need. However, because of their special
needs, disabled children cannot benefit from an educational environ-
ment that is not enriched and adapted to accommodate their disabili-
49. Id. The Lau Court specifically refused to decide the equal protection argument and
based its decision on statutory interpretation. California state law required a minimum level
of proficiency in English for high school graduation; therefore, because the Chinese children
were precluded from receiving any meaningful instruction due to the language barriers, it
was the responsibility of the school to remedy that situation. Id. at 565-68.
50. Haggerty & Sacks, Education ofthe Handicapped- Toward a Definition of an Appropri-
ate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 976, 979 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Definition ofAppropri-
ate Education.
51. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio School Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
52. 348 F. Supp. at 876.
53. Id. The Mills court stated:
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are
needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equita-
bly in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported edu-
cation consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies of
the District of Columbia Public School System, whether occasioned by insufficient
funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly can not be permitted to bear more
heavily on the "exceptional" or handicapped child than on the normal child.
Id.
54. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
ties. Thus, while Rodriguez may provide an adequate approach for
most children, it is not, or should not be, applicable to the disabled.
d What is an appropriate education for the disabled?
In light of the confusion over how to measure and define equality of
educational opportunity," the only manageable approach seems to be
to require that the disabled be provided with an education appropriate
to their needs. 6 The P1ARC and Mills decisions did much to develop a
specific list of steps to be followed in affording the disabled an appro-
priate education. Each child has a right to an individualized assess-
ment before placement57 that must utilize fair and unbiased testing
procedures. 58 Based on this assessment, an individualized educational
plan must be developed to meet the particular needs of the student.5 9
Whenever a child's placement is to be changed, a thorough reevalua-
tion is required.60 Furthermore, regular periodic reevaluations should
be conducted to prevent placement in special education from becoming
permanent.6' Overlaying this scheme is the general requirement that
disabled children be placed in the least restrictive alternative setting.62
The use of the least restrictive alternative, or "mainstreaming," means
that the disabled child must be placed in a program that will integrate
him or her as fully as possible into a regular classroom environment
with nondisabled students.63
55. See notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text.
56. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. at 307.
57. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. at 879.
58. Because of culturally and linguistically biased testing procedures, minorities are vastly
overrepresented in special education programs. See Legal Reform, supra note 3. In Diana
v. State Bd. of Educ., No. C-70-37 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 7, 1970), the state, in a consent
decree, agreed to use Spanish language I.Q. tests in testing Hispanic children for placement
in educable mentally retarded classes. Following the 1970 consent decree, the Diana case
has focused on the proper standards for measurement of minority enrollment and methods
of enforcing the consent decree. In Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the
court denounced the administration of standard I.Q. tests to black students as "concededly
irrational." Id. at 1313.
59. Defnition of Appropriate Education, supra note 50, at 976 n.83.
60. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. at 303-06.
61. Id.
62. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. at 880 ("placement in a regular public school
class with appropriate ancillary services is preferable to placement in a special school
class"); Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. at 302 (or-
der enjoining enforcement of state law prohibiting mentally retarded children access to pro-
gram of free education and training).
63. This policy means that "among all alternatives for placement within a general educa-
tional system, handicapped children should be placed where they can obtain the best educa-
tion at the least distance away from mainstream society." Note, The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act: Opening the Schoolhouse Door, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
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Case law has also developed a series of procedural safeguards to pro-
tect these rights. Parents must be given notice and an opportunity to be
heard whenever their child is to be evaluated or reevaluated.64 Parents
may obtain an independent evaluation of the child, examine school
records, present witnesses at the hearings, and be represented by coun-
sel. 5 In Mills, the burden of proof on all issues was placed on the
school district. 66 However, this placement of the burden of proof does
not appear to be a universally recognized element of the due process
rights afforded a student.67
2. Federal Statutory Provisions
a. The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
The earliest federal legislative attention to the problem of education
for the disabled involved minor provisions in the 1966 amendments to
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 8 In 1968, Congress
passed the Education of the Handicapped Act. 69 The volume of litiga-
tion in the early 1970's demonstrated that these statutory provisions
were inadequate, and Congress undertook to codify the judicial doc-
trines that had developed.7" The resulting legislation was the Educa-
tion of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (the Act).7 ' This Act
requires that each state adopt a plan for the identification, evaluation,
and education of all handicapped children.72 Those who have been
totally excluded from public education are designated as having first
priority in the expenditure of funds.7 3 Second priority is given to the
severely disabled who are not receiving an adequate or appropriate ed-
ucation.74 There must be full evaluation before placement or any
CHANGE 43,48 (1976) (citing Molloy, Law and the Handicapped, ScI. & CHILDREN, March,
1976, at 9) [hereinafter cited as Education for Al/I.
64. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. at 303-06.
65. Id.
66. 348 F. Supp. at 881.
67. Higher Hurdles, supra note 5, at 122.
68. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, 80
Stat. 1191 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 841 (1976)).
69. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1405, 1406, 1411-1420 (1976). For a general discussion of the his-
tory of early federal legislative efforts in the area of education for the disabled, see Education
for All, supra note 63, at 45-48.
70. Educationfor411, supra note 63, at 46. The compliance date for the Federal Act was
September 1978. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1976).
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1401-1461 (1976).
72. Id. § 1413.
73. 45 C.F.R. § 121 a.320(a) (1977).
74. Id. § 121 a.320(b).
1979]
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change in the child's program.75 In addition, a reevaluation is required
at least annually7 6 All evaluations must be based on more than one
testing instrument,77 and such tests cannot be biased. 78 The Act re-
quires mainstreaming7 9 and allows deviation from this principle only
as a measure of last resort.80
The Act also includes a series of procedural safeguards. Parents
must be notified by the school of pending actions regarding the dis-
abled child.8 Parents are entitled to file a complaint and receive an
impartial hearing if they choose to contest the school's placement deci-
sion.8" Unfortunately, there is no prohibition against a school official
serving as a hearing officer, and this provision could create a source of
potential bias.83 Parents have the right to examine school records.
84
Parents may obtain a free independent evaluation,8 5 but if the school's
evaluation is proved to be proper, the parents must pay for the outside
evaluation.8 6 Both parents and teachers are permitted to have the
assistance of counsel at hearings.87 If parents are dissatisfied with the
results of the hearing, they have the right of appeal to the state educa-
tional agency and ultimately the right to bring a civil action in state or
federal court.88
In addition to these provisions, which closely resemble the judicially
created standards, 89 the Act also contains some innovative provisions.
States must establish an advisory committee to oversee and monitor the
implementation of the state plan.90 Incentive grants are offered to
those states that provide educational programs for preschool-aged dis-
abled children.9 Preschool children are also afforded the minimum
75. Id. § 84.35(a).
76. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3)-(5)(B) (1976).
77. Id. § 1412(5)(C).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 1412(3)-(5).
80. Definition of,4ppropriate Education, supra note 50, at 987.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1976).
82. d. § 1415(b)(2).
83. The Federal Act only precludes state educational officials or employees "involved in
the education or care of the child" from acting as a hearing officer. Id. Thus, a teacher
other than the child's teacher or a principal from a different school can serve as a hearing
officer.
84. Id. § 1415(b)(l)(A).
85. 45 C.F.R. § 121 a.503(b) (1977).
86. Id.
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1) (1976).
88. Id. § 1415(e)(2).
89. See notes 57-66 supra and accompanying text.
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(12) (1976).
91. Funds are received under 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(a)(l); however, § 1419 gives states an ad-
[Vol. 12
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due process safeguards established for all handicapped children cov-
ered under the Act.92 Finally, the Act authorizes funding for the re-
moval of architectural barriers.93
Under the Act, funds are authorized according to the number of dis-
abled children a state serves. 94 A graduated funding scheme will in-
crease the federal contribution each year until it amounts to forty
percent of the state's expenditure per average daily attendance for each
disabled child.95 However, the percentage of students that the state
may claim as disabled cannot exceed twelve percent.
96
It is estimated that four billion dollars ultimately will be needed to
implement the Act.97 The federal funds authorized under the Act
would, if appropriated, cover only perhaps twenty-five percent of this
total cost.98 The states seem incapable and unwilling to supply the nec-
essary funding for implementation of the law.99 Even more disturbing
are indications that the limited federal funds authorized under the Act
may not be appropriated at all. "
Under the Act, the federal government will disburse the funds, but
the states will administer the program.' 0 ' This system was designed to
avoid objections that the federal government could intervene in educa-
tion, traditionally a state function.' 2 Local agencies will receive sev-
enty-five percent of the funds directly from the federal government,
and the states will retain control over the remaining twenty-five per-
cent.'0 3 The states also must match the federal allocations." This
scheme was designed to provide flexibility and preserve local autonomy
while providing some national uniformity. 05 But, it may also lead to
ditional $300 per year for each three- to five- year old child receiving special education.
Thus, § 1419 provides an incentive for preschool services.
92. Id. § 1415.
93. Id. § 1406.
94. Id. § 1411(a)(1)(A)-(B).
95. Id. § 1411(a)(l)(B)(v).
96. Id. § 1411(a)(5)(A)(i).
97. 121 CONG. REC. H7150 (daily ed. July 21, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Jeffords).
98. Id. at H7760 (daily ed. July 29, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Perkins).
99. Note, Enforcing Section 504 Regulations: The Need For a Private Cause of Action to
Remedy Discrimination Against the Handicapped, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 345, 357 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Enforcing Section 504].
100. Education for All, supra note 63, at 50-51.
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1976).
102. 121 CONG. REc. SI0,976 (daily ed. June 18, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1976).
104. Id. § 1411(c)(2)(B).
105. Id. §§ 1412-1413.
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coordination problems and inequities." 6
As will be seen, at least in California, inequities do exist between
districts in terms of the types of special education services available to
disabled children, 107 and there have been significant coordination
problems in implementing reforms in California.'0 8 However, because
compliance with the Act has only been mandatory since September
1978,109 it is difficult to determine to what extent these problems will
increase or decrease once the Act has been fully implemented. In addi-
tion, assessing the impact of the Act is complicated by the fact that
California has simultaneously enacted and implemented state legisla-
tion designed to reform special education) ° But, it is worth noting
that, in California, the inequitable distribution of educational funding
was held to violate the state constitution in Serrano . Priest."'t If and
when the redistribution of educational funds contemplated in Serrano
occurs, many of the present and potential inequities of special educa-
tion programming in California should be eliminated as well.
b. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973'12 prohibits discrimina-
tion by any federal contractor on the basis of disability. Since most
schools receive federal funds and are therefore covered by section 504,
its provisions overlap considerably with those of the Education of All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which applies to all elementary
and secondary schools. 14 One major difference is that section 504 ap-
plies even when a state does not apply for funding under the Act." 5
Section 504 also requires that private schools make accommodations
106. Educationfor All, supra note 63, at 51.
107. There are differences between districts in California because some districts have al-
ready implemented the Master Plan and some have not. See note 173 infra and accompany-
ing text.
108. See text accompanying notes 194-95 infra.
109. See note 70 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 155-71 infra.
111. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual. . . shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, or be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Feder-
al financial assistance. . . ." Id. [hereinafter cited as section 504]. In 1978 Congress passed
Public Law 95-602, which amended the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, but did not make any
substantial modification of Section 504.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
114. Definition of Appropriate Education, supra note 50, at 984.
115. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
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under certain circumstances.' 1 6 In addition, section 504 does not pro-
vide the due process standards or the incentive grants for preschool
children that are included in the Act. 7 The regulations under section
50411 contain provisions virtually identical to those previously dis-
cussed with regard to the Act. However, the slight differences between
the two statutes and their regulations make their combined coverage
broader and more effective than either statute acting alone. 119
B. California Law
1. California Constitutional and Early Statutory Provisions
The California Constitution charges the legislature with disseminat-
ing education and encouraging the development of school systems. 120
Judicial interpretation has construed this constitutional provision to
guarantee California's citizens a right to education. 121
The special education system in California is the result of several
decades of statutory evolution. This section will discuss the statutory
scheme that existed prior to the enactment of the Master Plan. The
new Master Plan system is discussed in detail in the next section. How-
ever, the older law is of more than historical importance because it is
still in effect in those districts where the Master Plan has not yet been
implemented. It should also be noted that when the legislature enacted
the Master Plan, it made certain modifications in the law affecting non-
Master Plan districts. These changes are discussed below.
The earliest special education programs for the disabled were those
for the mentally retarded. 122 Programs for the educable mentally re-
tarded and the trainable mentally retarded were mandatory in all
school systems under the California Code of Education,'23 for all
schools in California are governed by these statutes. 124 Because of the
concern over the effective permanence of placement, 125 a plan was
116. 45 C.F.R. § 84.39(a)-(b) (1977).
117. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
118. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31-84.40 (1977).
119. Educationfor All, supra note 63, at 61.
120. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
121. Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926 (1924); Ward v. Flood, 48
Cal. 36 (1874).
122. Legal Reform, supra note 3, at 96.
123. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56515 (West 1978).
124. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 33000-60670 .(West 1978) govern elementary and secondary
education. Postsecondary education is subject to CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 66000-94500 (West
1978).
125. See note 7 supra.
19791
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
adopted, pursuant to the expressed legislative intent,'26 to gradually re-
turn the retarded to regular classes. Placement in programs for the re-
tarded had been based primarily on the child's score on intelligence
tests. 127 In the wake of the decisions in Diana v. State Board of Educa-
tion 12 and Larry P. v. Riles129 prohibiting use of culturally biased tests,
the legislature required districts to specifically justify any overrepresen-
tation of minorities in programs for the retarded.' 30 This reform and
the requirement of parental consent before placement13 ' probably ac-
count for the decrease in enrollments in programs for the educable
mentally retarded.'
32
The second major component of the California approach to special
education was the creation of development centers for the severely
handicapped. 33 These were self-contained facilities designed to give
specialized assistance to the severely retarded, physically handicapped,
and others who were not provided with an education in the regular
schools. 134 The Education Code required that local school districts and
counties establish these special centers and classes.' 35 Presently, over
twenty-nine of the fifty-eight counties in the state continue to provide
such programs. 1
36
The Education Code also provided for centers and programs for the
educationally handicapped. 137 The "educationally handicapped" were
individuals with relatively minor learning disabilities. 38 These pro-
grams were recently made mandatory. 39 Educationally handicapped
children could have been placed in special day classes or learning disa-
bility groups. 40 But, whatever the instructional setting, schools were
supposed to return educationally handicapped children to regular
classes as quickly as possible."' Until recently, only two percent of a
126. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56504 (West 1978).
127. Id. § 56505.
128. No. C-70-37 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 7, 1970).
129. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
130. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56508 (West 1978).
131. Id § 56506.
132. LegalReform, supra note 3, at 99.
133. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56800-56865 (West 1978).
134. Id
135. Id § 56602.
136. Higher Hurdles, supra note 5, at 116.
137. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56600-56619 (West 1978).
138. Higher Hurdles, supra note 5, at 116.
139. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56602 (West 1978) (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6751 (West
1969)).
140. Legal Reform, supra note 3, at 97.
141. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56602 (West 1978).
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district's students could be classified as educationally handicapped,142
and enrollments could increase by no more than twenty percent annu-
ally. 143 These rules were apparently designed to discourage the ten-
dency of school officials to put any difficult child into educationally
handicapped programs.'"
Another aspect of the California system was the use of tuition vouch-
ers.1 45 Under this system, parents of children who were not served by
the public schools received tuition vouchers to cover the cost of placing
their children in a private school. 146 Such grants were mandatory for
most types of handicapped children except those categorized as educa-
tionally handicapped. 47 Not only was attendance at a private school
for the handicapped a poor substitute for the mainstreamed public edu-
cation guaranteed by federal law,148 but various procedural constraints
made tuition vouchers available to a very limited number of parents. 1
49
Another problem with the voucher system was that grants were calcu-
lated according to the amount expended by the local district.' 50 This
practice created hardships for disadvantaged families who tend to re-
side in districts where per pupil expenditures are low and resulted in
inequities.'
5'
As already indicated, in California, parental consent was and is re-
quired prior to placement of a student in special education.'52 An ad-
ditional safeguard was the establishment of admission committees
consisting of special educators, teachers, and parents who had to review
the placement of a child. 153 There were also further procedural rights
afforded to parents and children categorized as educationally handi-
capped or educable mentally retarded.
54
142. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6752 (West 1969) (repealed 1977) (current version at CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 56605 (West 1978)).
143. Id § 6752.1 (West 1969) (repealed 1977) (current version at CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 56606 (West 1978)).
144. Legal Reform, supra note 3, at 99.
145. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6870 (West 1969) (current version at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56030
(WEST 1978)).
146. Id
147. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56600 (West 1978).
148. See notes 79-80 supra.
149. Higher Hurdles, supra note 5, at 118-20.
150. Id at 120.
151. Id In Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977), inequities caused by property tax funding of education were
declared unconstitutional.
152. See note 131 supra.
153. LegalReform, supra note 3, at 98-99.
154. Id at 101.
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2. The Master Plan
Despite the extensive statutory scheme in existence at the time, many
disabled children were left unserved by the public schools in the early
1970's. 155 Still others were provided with inadequate and inappropri-
ate educational programs.156 Spurred by this failure, educators, parents
of students, and legislators began to develop a reorganized and revital-
ized special education program for California.157 This effort resulted in
the California Master Plan for Special Education which was adopted
on a pilot program basis by the legislature in 1974.158
The Master Plan involves several substantive reforms. One of the
most important is the elimination of the categorized programs which
resulted in the labeling of students." 9 It was hoped that the elimina-
tion of labeling would help prevent the stigmatizing effects that are
known to accompany that practice. 160 Districts are required to make
the full range of special educational programs available to their stu-
dents, 6' while mainstreaming disabled students wherever possible.162
The Master Plan further requires regular reevaluations of the progress
of each student. 1
63
The Master Plan also involves procedural reforms. Chief among
these are the requirements that individualized educational programs
(IEP's) be developed with parental involvement.'"
In 1977, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 1250,165
amending the Master Plan, in order to eliminate the July 1, 1978 termi-
nation date of the pilot program. 166 Assembly Bill 1250 provides for a
comprehensive phase-in program to extend the Master Plan throughout
155. CAL. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., CALIFORNIA MASTER PLAN FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION:
THIRD ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT 1976-77 at 1 [hereinafter cited as SPED REPORT I].
This report was used because the draft of the subsequent 1977-78 report, CAL. STATE DEP'T
OF EDUC., CALIFORNIA MASTER PLAN FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION: EVALUATION REPORT
1977-78 (Tent. Draft) [hereinafter cited as SPED REPORT II], omits data regarding the level
of integration achieved under the Master Plan and comparisons between Master Plan and
non-Master Plan districts. Without this critical data, the effectiveness of the Master Plan in
mainstreaming disabled students cannot be determined.
156. SPED REPORT I, supra note 155.
157. Id
158. 1974 Cal. Stats., ch. 1532 (A.B. 4040).
159. Legal Reform, supra note 3, at 111.
160. Labels and Stigma, supra note 6, at 560-61.
161. LegalReform, supra note 3, at I11.
162. Id
163. Id
164. See SPED REPORT I, supra note 155, at 2.
165. 1977 Cal. Stats., ch. 1247 (A.B. 1250).
166. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, DIGEST OF A.B. 1250, at 2 (1977).
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the state. 67 This bill also expands the due process procedures and re-
quires that fair hearing panels be established to review parents' com-
plaints about their child's placement.
168
In addition to its amendment of the Master Plan, Assembly Bill 1250
requires changes in special education programs provided by school dis-
tricts that presently have not implemented the Master Plan. Most nota-
ble among these changes is that programs for the educationally
handicapped become mandatory. 169 In addition, the old two percent
limit on enrollments in programs for the educationally handicapped
has been eliminated. 7 Finally, the bill provides that allotments under
the various categories of special education programs shall increase by
six percent annually.171
C. Analysis of the Calfornia System in Operation
1. Non-Master Plan Districts
The implementation of the Master Plan is being accomplished on a
phase-in basis.172 Even today, the majority of disabled children in Cal-
ifornia are not covered by the Master Plan. 1 3 Thus, pre-Master Plan
special education programs are still of considerable, though decreasing,
importance.
The Master Plan was developed because previously existing pro-
grams in California were inadequate to meet the needs of handicapped
children. 174 Because Assembly Bill 1250 made only minor modifica-
tions in non-Master Plan programs, it would follow that these pro-
grams are, even now, inadequate and do not comply with The
Education of All Handicappped Children Act or section 504. This be-
lief is confirmed by an examination of the actual operation of the non-
Master Plan programs. Some handicapped students are still completely
excluded from public education. 75 These programs are, therefore, vio-
167. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 56301 (West 1978).
168. Id §§ 56036, 56336-56341.4.
169. Id § 56602.
170. Id § 56605.
171. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, DIGEST OF A.B. 1250, at 2 (1977).
172. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56301 (West 1978).
173. Interview with Gail Imobersteg, Chief Administrative Analyst of the Special Educa-
tion Division, California Department of Education, in Sacramento, California (Jan. 12,
1979). As of the 1978-79 school year, only 27.7% of all special education students are en-
rolled in districts currently implementing the Master Plan. Id
174. See SPED REPORT I, supra note 155, at I.
175. 10,240 or 23% of all disabled students who had been identified were not being served
during 1976-77 in the non-Master Plan districts. See SPED REPORT I, supra note 155, at 24-
25 (Tables 2-3).
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lative of the major provisions of the federal statutes protecting the edu-
cational rights of the disabled.
2. Master Plan Districts
In order to eliminate the stigma caused by labeling,'76 the Master
Plan was designed to abolish the variety of specific categories in special
education programs and to treat all disabled children as "individuals
with exceptional needs."' 7  But, the abolition of specific categories
really amounts to little more than a bit of legislative sleight of hand, for
"individuals with exceptional needs" are defined in terms of the old
labels. 7 8 Furthermore, data for the Master Plan evaluation report are
collected according to the type of disability.' 9 Thus, it is clear that the
schools continue to give disabled children specific labels.180
One major objective of the Master Plan was to afford all disabled
students access to free and appropriate public education.' 8 ' Significant
176. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
177. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56301(h) (West 1978).
178. The term "individuals with exceptional needs" is defined as including "all pupils
whose special education needs cannot be met by the regular classroom teacher with modifi-
cation of the regular school program, who require the benefit of special education services."
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56302(c) (West 1978). Thus, individuals with exceptional needs are
those who need special education. Special education is defined as those
programs or services specially designed to meet the requirements of individuals with
exceptional needs. Programs for the communicatively handicapped serve those pupils
with disabilities in one or more of the communication skills such as language, speech,
and hearing. Programs for the physically handicapped serve those pupils with physical
disability such as vision . . . mobility. . . or other health impairments. Programs for
the learning handicapped serve pupils with significant disabilities in learning or behav-
ior. . . . Programs for the severely handicapped serve pupils with profound disabili-
ties and who require intensive instruction and training such as the developmentally
disabled, trainable mentally retarded, autistic, and seriously emotionally disturbed.
Id § 56302(g). In the same subsection, the legislature indicates its recognition of the
problems involved in classification and labeling by stating:
It is the intent of the Legislature in this definition to provide general classifications of
special education programs. The Legislature also recognizes that a pupil may appropri-
ately require services from more than one classification of program and that the exam-
ples given for each classification do not imply that such pupils can be grouped in a class
or program without regard to the individual educational needs of the pupils served.
Id Despite this cautionary language, it appears that special education under the Master
Plan has continued to be handled through strict use of classifications and labeling. A careful
examination of the data presented in the SPED REPORT I, supra note 155, indicates that
statistics are kept on the number of students in each category and that all students are as-
signed to one of the four categories defined in CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56352 (West 1978).
179. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56352 (West 1978). See generally SPED REPORT I, Supra note
155.
180. Interview with Cathy Blakemore, Chief Counsel for Special Education Project, Los
Angeles Legal Aid Foundation, in Los Angeles, California (Jan. 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited
as Blakemore Interview].
181. SPED REPORT II, supra note 155, at I.
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progress has been made in this area. In 1976-1977, only twenty-three
disabled students were excluded from special education programs.
82
The Federal Act requires that all disabled students be given an indi-
vidualized assessment and educational program. 83 The Master Plan
provides that individual educational plans (IEP's) must be drawn up
for each student.' 84  However, in practice, the IEP is nothing more
than a standardized program designed for a particular type of disabil-
ity, 85 often permitting very little modification or individualization.
86
This unsatisfactory procedure is perpetuated by the continued use of
specific disability labels.'
87
The mainstreaming required under both the Act and the Master Plan
can be effective and helpful to disabled students by aiding them in
learning the skills necessary to function in a non-handicapped soci-
ety. 188 In many cases, it should also be less expensive for schools to
integrate handicapped students into regular classes than to maintain
them in expensive special programs.' 89 In short, mainstreaming .is a
technique that is cost beneficial for disabled students and for society as
a whole. 9 Although full integration into a regular classroom setting
may not be appropriate for all disabled children, the Act makes main-
streaming the favored procedure from which a school may deviate only
in the last resort.' 9 '
Unfortunately, the results of the practical application of mainstream-
ing have been dismal. Statistics indicate that the level of integration
(measured by the amount of time a disabled student spends in a regular
classroom) changed very little upon implementation of the Master Plan
in California.'9 2 Presumably, if mainstreaming were working, regular
182. SPED REPORT I, supra note 155, at 7.
183. See notes 75-78 supra and accompanying text.
184. SPED REPORT I, supra note 155, at 2.
185. Blakemore Interview, supra note 180.
186. Id
187. See notes 178-80 supra and accompanying text.
188. Education/or All, supra note 63 at 59.
189. Id at 58.
190. "A denial of education burdens handicapped children for life, forcing them as adults
to seek welfare assistance or placement in state or city institutions. Lifetime institutionaliza-
tion can cost as much as $400 thousand per person .... " Id
19 1. Definition of Appropriate Education, supra note 50, at 987.
192. Increases in time spent in the regular classroom were insignificant for the learning
handicapped and the severely handicapped. The level of integration for the communica-
tively handicapped initially increased but then slightly declined during the second year of
Master Plan implementation. Integration levels for the physically handicapped declined
markedly during both years of Master Plan implementation. The failure of the implementa-
tion of mainstreaming is underscored by the fact that these statistics include only those stu-
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classroom teachers would now be more aware of the needs of disabled
students and the programs available to assist such students. The figures
indicate, however, that the level of awareness among regular classroom
teachers has not increased but, rather, has actually decreased with con-
tinued implementation of the Master Plan. 93 Thus, it is relatively clear
that, at least in California, mainstreaming has been implemented in
theory alone.
In an extensive review of legal reforms in special education, Profes-
sor Kirp, a noted author in the field, and his colleagues concluded that
legal mandates of interagency coordination are virtually unenforceable
because courts and legislatures cannot effectively police the coopera-
tion agreements they mandate. 94 The results of Master Plan imple-
mentation confirm this conclusion. Coordination between local school
districts and the offices of county superintendents of education was
poor during the first three years of implementation of the Master
Plan. 195
Both the Federal Act 196 and the Master Plan 19 7 provide for expanded
procedural rights for disabled students and their parents. One problem
with these procedures is that they do not specify by what rules or regu-
lations the fair hearing panels should operate.' 98 The same problem
existed with the admissions committees that operated under pre-Master
Plan provisions. 99 This lack of guidelines leads to inconsistent results
and the use of questionable informal procedures.200
An additional problem under the Master Plan is that fair hearing
panels are comprised of one representative from the school district, one
member appointed by the parent, and a third member selected by the
first two.20 ' This procedure might work well enough except that, if the
third member is not appointed within a specified period of time, the
county superintendent of schools may appoint the third member.20 2
dents who spent part of their school day in a regular classroom. Therefore the statistics do
not reflect the approximately 2,000 special education pupils who were completely segregated
from regular classes. See SPED REPORT 1, supra note 155, at 23, 31 (Tables I & 7).
193. While regular teachers were more aware after the first year of inplementation of the
Master Plan, awareness decreased during the second year. In non-Master Plan districts
awareness levels also declined. See id at 45 (Table 19).
194. Legal Reform, supra note 3, at 92-93.
195. SPED REPORT II, supra note 155, at 7.
196. See notes 81-88 supra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 163-64 supra and accompanying text.
198. Blakemore Interview, supra note 180.
199. Legal Reform, supra note 3, at 102-03.
200. Id
201. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56341.3 (West 1978).
202. Id
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This provision encourages the original member appointed by the
school to procrastinate such that the default mechanism, which favors
the school, will be triggered.
20 3
These and other problems with the due process mechanisms of the
Master Plan have resulted in the limited effectiveness of changes in this
area. The procedures can be made to work by a capable and persistent
parent but afford little protection for the unsophisticated or passive
parent.20 4 But, this same situation existed before the implementation of
the Master Plan.2"5 Furthermore, schools often fail to inform parents
of special education services available under the Master Plan.20 6 These
problems underscore the need for effective parent groups capable of
carrying on active advocacy for the rights of disabled children.20 7
The existence of a separate system of special education inherently
discourages meaningful improvement in the education of disabled chil-
dren.20 8 Lack of change occurs because the existence of special educa-
tion programs gives regular classroom teachers a tempting opportunity
to dispense with children whom they find difficult to handle.20 9 At the
same time, special educators resist reforms that lessen the role of spe-
cial education because such changes threaten their livelihood.210 Thus,
the continued existence of separate programs of special education is a
convenient solution for all educators.
The validity of this thesis in the context of the "real world" is borne
out by the limited effect that Master Plan implementation has had on
programs for disabled children. The most persuasive evidence is that
implementation of mainstreaming has been unsuccessful, 211 probably
because mainstreaming is the aspect of special education reform that
regular classroom teachers are most likely to resist.21 2
203. Blakemore Interview, supra note 180.
204. Id
205. Legal Reform, supra note 3, at 105-06.
206. SPED REPORT II, supra note 155, at 7.
207. LegalReform supra note 3, at 114. In California two groups exist that assist parents
and are active in advocacy for disabled students in special education. These are the Califor-
nia Association for the Retarded and the California Association for Neurologically Handi-
capped Children. Id at 106 & n.294.
208. Id at 53.
209. Id at 113.
210. Id
211. See notes 192-93 supra and accompanying text.
212. Education/or All, supra note 63, at 53.
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IV. POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION AND THE DISABLED
A. Postsecondary Education Distinguished/from Elementary and
Secondary Education
The Rodriguez decision213 dealt exclusively with elementary and sec-
ondary education; it provided no basis for asserting a "right" to higher
education. Even if, as Rodriguez implies,214 there may be a constitu-
tionally guaranteed minimum level of education, that education would
fall short of that provided by colleges and universities.215 Thus, the
precedent prohibiting exclusion of the disabled based on a right to an
education 211 is inapplicable in the context of postsecondary education.
Disabled students in higher education tend to be only those with
physical, perceptual, or communicative disorders.21 This result occurs
presumably because colleges and universities have entrance require-
ments based on academic achievement that students with serious learn-
ing disabilities or pronounced mental retardation are unable to meet.
While mainstreaming is a recent innovation in elementary and sec-
ondary education,1 ' it is a commonplace and almost universally ac-
cepted procedure in postsecondary education.1 9 In postsecondary
education, the emphasis is on providing disabled students with the sup-
port services necessary to allow them to function normally in the class-
room and in the nonacademic environment of the campus.22
0
213. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
214. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
215. Because the Rodriguez Court found that the Texas system of elementary and secon-
dary education provided "each child with an opportunity to acquire ... basic minimal
skills," 411 U.S. at 36, any constitutionally guaranteed right to education must be confined
to a relatively low level of academic skills. Undoubtedly any college or university would
offer education far in excess of this minimum level.
216. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
217. In the California State University and College system (the only system presently
maintaining such statistics), 90% of all identified disabled students fall into these categories.
OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES, DISABLED
STUDENTS AND EMPLOYEE PROGRAM CHANGE PROPOSAL FOR 1979-80 at 16 (Table 2)
(1978) [hereinafter cited as PROGRAM CHANGE PROPOSAL].
218. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
219. "The Commission believes that the objective of this statewideplan-and tie objective of
all segmental planning to provide education to students with disabilities-should be to integrate
or "mainstream'the student into the general campusprograms and activities as/ar and as quick-
ly aspossible." CALIFORNIA POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION COMMISSION, A STATE PLAN
FOR INCREASING THE REPRESENTATION OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES IN PUBLIC
HIGHER EDUCATION 3 (1978) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as CPEC PLAN].
220. Id
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B. Federal Law
1. Regulatory Framework
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973221 can be relied upon
frequently to prohibit disability-based discrimination in postsecondary
education because the statute applies to all agencies receiving federal
funds. Under the regulations implementing section 504, institutions of
higher learning are required to make their programs accessible to the
disabled.22 2 Meeting these requirements may involve the removal of
architectural barriers if programs are housed in inaccessible facili-
ties. 223 Academic and career counseling must be nonrestrictive and
must not unduly limit the choices available to disabled students.2 2 4 It is
further required that disabled students be educated in the most inte-
grated setting possible u.2 2  Each institution must perform a self-evalua-
tion to determine whether it is in compliance with these provisions.2 6
If not, the campus must develop a transition plan that will bring it into
compliance with the regulations.2 27
Although the regulations promulgated under section 504 have only
been in effect since May 1977, there are already a number of serious
questions about their interpretation. One problem involves the lan-
guage of section 84.44(d) of the regulations. This section requires that
a deaf student be provided with an interpreter or other effective means
of making orally presented materials available.2 2 8 This ambiguous
wording has encouraged some institutions to attempt to avoid provid-
ing interpreters for deaf students. Two deaf students at California
State University, Hayward, have filed suit in district court for the
Northern District of California, seeking to force the university to make
interpreter services available.229 At this writing, the school is still re-
sisting the use of interpreters and has, instead, provided the-plaintiffs
with tape recorders to record their courses.2 30 This solution will permit
lectures to be transcribed after class but denies the deaf student the
221. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). For the text of § 504, see note 112 supra.
222. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.42-84.44 (1977).
223. Id §§ 84.21-84.22.
224. Id § 84.47(b).
225. Id § 84.44.
226. Id § 84.6(c)(1)(i).
227. Id § 84.6(c)(l)(ii)-(iii).
228. Id § 84.44(d).
229. Herbold v. Trustees, No. C-78-1358 (N.D. Cal., filed June 21, 1978).
230. Address by David Huerta, Chief Enforcement Officer for Section 504, Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Civil Rights, Region IX, to Disabled Students
Coalition Fall Conference, in Palo Alto, California (Oct. 20, 1978).
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opportunity to participate in classroom discussions and to question or
clarify statements made by the instructor.
Section 84.44(d) of the regulations also states that schools need not
provide attendants or readers for personal use or study.23' Because the
term "personal use" is left undefined, there are a number of questions
about the interpretation of this provision. While leisure reading might
reasonably be considered the "personal use" of a reader, arguably, re-
search required for a course could also be termed "personal use," yet
schools clearly should cover reader service for such purposes. More-
over, there may be some uses of attendants, such as transferring a
chair-bound individual from an automobile to a wheelchair, that are
essential to afford a disabled student access to campus. Even though
such functions are nonacademic in nature, services that are so essential
to participation in the academic program should not be classified as
"personal use" and should be provided by the educational institu-
tion.23 2
2. Judicial Interpretation
The leading case regarding the application of section 504 to post-
secondary education is Davis v. Southeastern Community College.233 In
Davis, the plaintiff, a deaf student, sought admission to a training pro-
gram for registered nurses at the defendant college.2 34 When admission
was denied, plaintiff brought suit in federal court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of North Carolina alleging a violation of her rights under section
504. The trial court ruled for the defendant,235 the Fourth Circuit re-
versed, 236 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
handing down its landmark decision on June 11, 1979. The decision
attempts, with only partial success, to deal with a number of the issues
raised under section 504.
A major issue addressed by the Court was whether disability may
legitimately be considered when determining whether a person is
"otherwise qualified" within the meaning of section 504. The thrust of
section 504 is that no otherwise qualified handicapped person may be
subjected to discrimination in any program receiving federal assist-
ance.237 The district court had held that "[o]therwise qualified can only
231. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d)(2) (1977).
232. See DSC Position Paper, supra note 9.
233. 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979).
234. Id. at 2364.
235. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
236. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978).
237. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See note 112 supra for the text of the statute.
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be read to mean otherwise able to function sufficiently in the position
sought in spite of the handicap, ifproper training andfaciliies are suita-
ble and available."'238 The Fourth Circuit had ruled that "otherwise
qualified" meant that the college should consider plaintiffs admission
without regard to her disability.2 3 9 The Supreme Court chose to adopt
the view of the district court, concluding that educational institutions
are free to impose "reasonable physical qualifications" for admission to
their programs.240
This conclusion is suspect for several reasons. First, the Court relied
heavily on commentary by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) regarding the definition of a qualified handicapped
person under the Department's regulations. 241 The regulations indicate
that a disabled student must meet all the academic and technical stan-
dards requisite to admigsion to a school's program.242 The appendix
cited by the Court indicates that this includes all standards that are
essential to participation in the program in question.243 Indeed, the
Court itself stated, "We think it clear, therefore that HEW interprets
the 'other' qualifications which a handicapped person may be required
to meet as including necessary physical qualifications."' 2 4 But, from
this the Court moved without analysis or justification to the conclusion
that any reasonable physical qualification is acceptable. 245
In certain cases there may well be a difference between a qualifica-
tion that is reasonable and one that is actually necessary. However, the
use of the "reasonableness" approach becomes untenable, for the Court
indicated that educational institutions will have broad discretion to de-
fine the legitimate purposes of its programs.246 Thus, as in Davis, if a
school defines the purposes of its program carefully, it may claim that
"reasonable" physical qualifications exist that exclude disabled stu-
dents.
Finally, it should be noted that, while the Court adopted the view of
the district court on this issue, a significant phrase from the opinion of
the district court was not discussed. The language of the trial court
238. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C. 1976)
(emphasis added).
239. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1160 (4th Cir. 1978).
240. 99 S. Ct. at 2371.
241. Id. at 2367.
242. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1977).
243. Id. app. A, A(5) at 405.
244. 99 S. Ct. at 2367 (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 2371.
246. Id. at 2370.
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includes a phrase that indicates that a handicapped person can only be
expected to meet all program requirements if suitable training and fa-
cilities are available.247 Presumably, the Supreme Court intended to
incorporate this limitation when it adopted the position that disabled
applicants must meet all standards requisite to admission to the pro-
gram. If not, the Court's position goes beyond the determinations
made by the trial court.
The Court next considered whether section 504 imposes an obliga-
tion on educational institutions to undertake "affirmative conduct" in
order to assist the disabled.2 48 The Court concluded that educational
institutions were not obliged to act affirmatively by lowering standards
or substantially modifying program requirements in order to insure ac-
cess to the disabled.2 49 This becomes a keystone of the decision, for the
Court determined that the plaintiff would not have been able to partici-
pate in the defendant's program given the type of accommodation de-
fendant was obliged to make.2 50 However, it should be noted that this
conclusion was not based on any factual determination made by the
trial court. HEW had not issued regulations until after the trial court
had completed its deliberations; thus no finding was ever made on
whether the plaintiff could have benefited from accommodations re-
quired under those regulations.2
While affirmative conduct may not be required, section 504 does ex-
pressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of handicap. The issue
thus becomes one of defining the line between lawful refusal to extend
affirmative assistance and illegal discrimination. The Court recognized
that this line will not always be clear and that there may be instances
when affirmative conduct will be necessary to avoid discrimination.5 3
Yet, in Davis, the Justices indicated that the defendant's failure to mod-
ify its standards did not constitute discrimination because those stan-
247. See text accompanying note 238 supra (italicized phrase).
248. 99 S. Ct. at 2369.
249. Id. at 2371.
250. Id. at 2368-69. The Court stated:
Furthermore, it is reasonably clear that § 84.44(a) does not encompass the kind of cur-
ricular changes that would be necessary to accomodate respondent in the nursing pro-
gram. In light of respondent's inability to function in clinical courses without close
supervision, Southeastern with prudence could allow her to take only academic classes.
Whatever benefits respondent might realize from such a course of study, she would not
receive a rough equivalent of the training a nursing program normally gives. Such a
fundamental alteration in the nature of a program is far more than the "modification"
the regulation requires.
25 . DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
ANALYSIS: SOUTHEASTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE ;/ DAVIS 6 (June 18, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as HEW DAVIS ANALYSIS].
252. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See note 112 supra for text of the statute.
253. 99 S. Ct. at 2370.
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dards were legitimate ones accepted by many institutions with similar
programs. 54 Again, this approach gives to those accused of discrimi-
nation the power to define for themselves the standards by which they
will be judged.
At this writing, it is impossible to assess the ultimate impact of the
Davis decision. The scope of the decision may very wel be limited by
the fact that Davis involved issues of public health and safety.255 The
Court also indicated a willingness to believe that handicapped persons,
through technological or other advances, might be able to function in
certain roles not now possible.2 6 At the same time, the decision does
include language that could weaken the regulations promulgated by
HEW.25 7 In effect, the Court stated that if the regulations impose af-
firmative conduct obligations on educational institutions, then the reg-
ulations are invalid as unauthorized extensions of the statute. 258 HEW
has rejected the implication that the regulations may be invalid259 but
has taken the position that the purposes of programs as defined by the
educational institution must be given considerable deference.2 60 De-
spite some indecision on this point, it seems fairly certain that the
Court upheld the regulations because it relied heavily on them to sup-
port parts of its analysis,26' and because, in the end, the Court applied
the regulations to the facts of the case.
3. Unresolved Issues
Although services to disabled students in higher education have tra-
ditionally been provided through vocational rehabilitation agencies,
the regulations seem to indicate that responsibility for funding these
services has been shifted to the educational institutions. 62 Indeed, re-
habilitation agencies are now contemplating withdrawing or reducing
their support for disabled students.263 However, this interpretation is
not explicitly supported by the regulations, and financial pressures have
prompted educational administrators to look to rehabilitation agencies
and other sources for continued support a.2 4 HEW, the agency charged
254. Id. at 2370-7 1.
255. Id. n.12.
256. Id. at 2370.
257. Id. at 2369-70 & n.ll.
258. Id.
259. HEW DAVIS ANALYSIS, supra note 251, at 8.
260. Id. at 6.
261. See notes 241-44 supra and accompanying text.
262. "[These regulations apply] to each recipient of Federal financial assistance from the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and to each program or activity that receives
or benefits from such assistance." 45 C.F.R. § 84.2 (1977).
263. See PROGRAM CHANGE PROPOSAL, supra note 217, at 8.
264. Id at 8-9.
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with enforcement of section 504 as it applies to education, has issued a
memorandum indicating that, until a permanent policy is established,
rehabilitation agencies may continue to support disabled students
where necessary.265 Clearly, this funding conflict must be resolved.
Some agency must bear ultimate responsibility for providing the serv-
ices required under section 504 and its regulations.
Another problem is that section 504 mandates compliance with cer-
tain standards but does not provide federal funding for bringing educa-
tional institutions into compliance. Costs for compliance with section
504 will be substantial and states may be unwilling or unable to finance
programs on their own.266 The issue was addressed in Barnes v. Con-
verse College.267 In Barnes, a deaf student brought suit against a pri-
vate college to obtain the interpreter she required.26 The court granted
the relief sought, partly because the defendant could not show financial
hardship269 sufficient to trigger the exception provided by the regula-
tions.270 The Barnes court went on to point out that the potential hard-
ship of future compliance with section 504 (that which the defendant
feared most) is not a proper consideration under the statute.2
Another issue with respect to section 504 is whether individuals have
a private right of action under the statute. Although nothing in the
statute explicitly permits a private cause of action, several federal
courts have already held that such a right does exist under section
504.272 However, an article entitled Private College273 questions those
265. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVEL-
OPMENT SERVICES, SECTION 504 - AUXILIARY AIDS MATTER: INTERIM POLICY STATE-
MENT 1 (1977).
266. See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
267. 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
268. Id at 639.
269. "Defendant, Converse College, would, in this action, be faced with the relatively
minor financial damage of an interpreter's fee which has been estimated at somewhat less
than $1,000." Id at 638.
270. The regulations provide that "[a] recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of its program." 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1977).
271. "[Tlhe danger of future expenditures. . . is not a proper consideration in this law-
suit .... " 436 F. Supp. at 638.
272. Leary v. Crapsey, 556 F.2d 863 (2nd Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. An-
dre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd
v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F.
Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Bartells v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F.
Supp. 180 (S.D.W. Va. 1976); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.W. Va. 1976);
Germankin v. Costanza, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
273. Brooks, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Private College: Barnes
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decisions.
Private College first suggests that the results reached in Lloyd v. Re-
gional Transportation Authority274 and other similar cases may be sus-
pect because of their reliance on Lau v. Nichols27 in which the issue of
plaintiffs' right to bring a private action was not raised.27 ' The Lloyd
decision relied on the phrase, "and permit a judicial remedy through a
private action," from a Senate report277 on section 504 as indicative of
congressional intent to create a private cause of action.278 Private Col-
lege argues that this phrase should be construed to refer only to judicial
review of final administrative actions and not to a court hearing held
prior to the exhaustion of plaintiff's administrative remedies.27 9 To
support this contention, Private College quotes the following language
from Lloyd:
"We expressly leave open... the question of whether, after consolidated
procedural enforcement regulations are issued to implement section 504,
the judicial remedy available must be limited to post-administrative rem-
edy judicial review. . . . But assuming a meaningful administrative en-
forcement mechanism, the private cause of action under section 504
should be limited to aposteriori judicial review.",
280
As the issue was expressly reserved, the second sentence of the above
quotation is dictum. Even if Lloyd does tentatively limit judicial re-
view to post-administrative action, it does so only if meaningful admin-
istrative enforcement mechanisms exist. There are indications that the
present administrative mechanisms for section 504 enforcement are not
v. Converse College, 29 MERCER L. REV. 745, 752-56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Private
College].
274. 548 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977). In Lloyd, physically disabled plaintiffs sought access
to mass public transportation under section 504. This leading case held that individual
plaintiffs could maintain a private cause of action under section 504.
275. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). In Lau, the plaintiffs, students of Chinese ancestry, brought an
action under § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), and succeeded
in obtaining compensatory bilingual educational programs.
276. Private College, supra note 273, at 751-52. Although Lau did not explicitly hold that
a private right of action exists, it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court did not realize the
significance of allowing the suit to proceed on this previously unprecedented basis. Though
it is not legally required to raise such issues, the Court presumably understood the logical
implications of its silence on this issue and tacitly authorized the private right of action.
277. S. Rep. No. 93-1270, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6390-91.
278. 548 F.2d at 1286.
279. Private College, supra note 273, at 755.
280. Id (quoting Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d at 1286 n.29).
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effective.281 It should also be noted that the, statement of legislative
intent relied on in Lloyd28 2 could easily be read to give immediate re-
course to the federal courts without the necessity of exhausting admin-
istrative remedies. Given the inadequacies of the existing
administrative enforcement scheme,'283 such an interpretation may be
both necessary and desirable284 in order to give effect to the broad pur-
poses of section 504.
Private College raises another major issue about section 504 by con-
tending that the HEW regulations on postsecondary education are un-
constitutional because they exceed congressional authorization.285 The
premise of this argument is that the Constitution prohibits Congress
from delegating legislative authority and that administrative agencies,
therefore, cannot promulgate regulations.286 Private College concedes
that this theory has practically never been used to strike down regula-
tions" and that the Supreme Court will sustain the validity of regula-
tions promulgated under an empowering provision of a statute as long
as the regulations are reasonably related to the statutory purposes. 88
Nevertheless, Private College contends that the section 504 regula-
tions should be subject to stricter scrutiny because they have been
promulgated under implied congressional authorization.289 This argu-
ment is based on General Electric v. Gilbert,9 ° which involved regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
under an authorization similar to that of Section 504. The Gilbert
Court stated:
Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority
to promulate rules or regulations pursuant to that title .... This does
281. See Comment, Rehabilitating the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 247, 265-
74 (1978); Enforcing Section 504, supra note 99, at 359 n.79.
282. See note 277 supra and accompanying text.
283. See authorities cited note 281 supra.
284. For a general discussion of the legal and practical arguments favoring a private right
of action without the necessity of administrative action, see Enforcing Section 504, supra
note 99, at 361-62.
285. Private College, supra note 273, at 756-59.
286. Id at 756.
287. Id (citing Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). These cases were decided during the controversy over
New Deal legislation and, because of these unique circumstances, they have never been
accorded the weight of controlling precedent. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 2.06 at
99-101 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAviS].
288. Private College, supra note 273, at 756-57 (citing Mourning v. Family Serv. Pubs.,
Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Thrope v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969); American Trucking
Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953)).
289. Private College, supra note 273, at 757.
290. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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not mean that the EEOC guidelines are not entitled to consideration in
determining legislative intent.. . . But it does mean that courts properly
may accord less weight to such guidelines than to administrative regula-
tions which Congress has declared shall have the force of law.
29 1
A careful reading of this language fails to reveal any justification for
Private College's conclusion that such regulations should be subjected
to strict scrutiny. In Gilbert, the court was clearly discussing the weight
to be accorded administrative regulations in determining congressional
legislative intent and, in this context, congressional ratification would,
of course, be an important factor. But the question of how courts
should judge the constitutionality of such regulations is an entirely sep-
arate issue not addressed in Gilbert. Moreover, the Gilbert Court
makes clear that while interpretive rules (rules promulgated under im-
plied congressional authorization) are generally accorded great defer-
ence,292 the peculiar defects of the rule at issue in that case were so
extraordinary that the rule could not be regarded as controlling.293
Since there is no evidence that the HEW regulations under section 504
have any of the serious defects found in Gilbert, these regulations cer-
tainly should not be disregarded or subjected to extraordinary judicial
scrutiny. The regulations need only be related to the purposes of the
statute.
The Private College argument is further flawed by the fact that it
ignores the realities of federal funding. Private College apparently
fears that private schools will be forced to used their own funds to pro-
vide services to disabled students.2 94 In a technical sense, this conten-
tion may be true. But, because section 504 only applies to recipients of
federal funds, 95 only those educational institutions receiving federal
funds are required to expend some of that money to insure access for
disabled students. For example, if a private school receives $10,000 for
research and expends $1,000 for an interpreter, as required by section
504, it is as if the federal research grant were for $9,000 and the govern-
291. Id at 141.
292. Id at 141-42. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971);
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (197 1) (Marshall, J., concurring); Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). See
generall, DAvIs, supra note 287, § 5.05 at 314-15.
293. In Gilbert, the Court noted that the EEOC guideline upon which the plaintiff relied
was promulgated nearly eight years after the enactment of the statute and could not, there-
fore, be regarded as contemporaneous (a criterion important in determining legislative in-
tent). 429 U.S. at 142. The Court also indicated that the EEOC guideline was in direct
conflict with earlier interpretations by that same agency and with authoritative interpreta-
tions by other agencies. Id at 144-45.
294. See Private College, supra note 273, at 757-59.
295. See note 112 supra.
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ment were paying the school $1,000 to provide the interpreter. Indeed,
requiring institutions to make affirmative expenditures to insure equal-
ity for disadvantaged groups is an accepted procedure under other
analogous statutes.296
In addition, Private College appears to misread the decision in Barnes
v. Converse College.297 It argues that the regulations, as interpreted in
Barnes, are unconstitutional because they impose undue hardship on
private institutions and are, therefore, probably beyond the intent of
Congress in enacting section 504.298 However, the regulations do pro-
vide an exception for financial hardship.299 Barnes does not contra-
vene this provision or require private institutions to provide services to
disabled students without regard to the institution's ability to pay.
Rather, the Barnes court merely found that, in the case before it, the
defendant college would not sustain undue financial hardship.300 The
court distinguished present financial hardship, which can be consid-
ered, and future potential hardship, which cannot.30 1 In light of the
Barnes decision, the Private College argument that Congress knew of
the plight of private schools and could not have intended that section
504 apply to these institutions cuts both ways. Assuming that Congress
was aware of the fiscal condition of private schools, its failure to ex-
empt them from coverage under the statute might reasonably be con-
strued as a deliberate act.
Finally, even if one accepts Private College's analysis of congres-
sional intent, the conclusion reached is anomalous and indefensible. It
concludes that private schools should not have to provide interpreters
or other auxiliary aids but may satisfy their obligations under section
504 by admitting the disabled student and providing a barrier-free en-
vironment. °2 This view reflects a limited understanding of disability,
namely, that the only real problems encountered by the handicapped in
general are physical obstacles. The fact that the lack of an interpreter is
296. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (compensatory bilingual instruction
required for students of Chinese ancestry pursuant to § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)).
297. 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
298. Private College, supra note 273, at 757. The article suggests that the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 was intended to apply only to state and federal rehabilitation programs, but the
sole support for this assertion is the mention of a few illustrative provisions of the Act. Id
These illustrations are not indicative of the purposes of § 504 in particular.
299. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1977).
300. 436 F. Supp. at 638. See also note 269 supra.
301. 436 F. Supp. at 638-39. See also note 271 supra
302. Private College, supra note 273, at 758.
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as much of a barrier to a deaf person as the lack of an elevator is to a
physically disabled person is ignored.
Private College goes on to state that failure to provide an interpreter
does not deny access "solely" on the basis of disability but, rather, de-
nies access merely because of the absence of a person or thing, a form
of discrimination Private College asserts is not covered by section
504.303 Surely, section 504 does not require that barriers caused by the
physical presence of a thing, such as a flight of stairs leading into a
building, and those caused by the absence of a person or thing, such as
an interpreter, an elevator, or a braille marker, be distinguished. Such
a reading of section 504 would lead to complex litigation based on
subtle semantic arguments, inequitable application of the law, and the
eventual effective repeal of the statute.
C. The Caifornia Approach
1. Community College Programs: Assembly Bill 77
In 1976, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 77,301 which
established and funded programs for disabled students enrolled in the
community colleges of the state. This legislation provides for many of
the same services that are now required under section 504. Assembly
Bill 77 also provides funding for a program on each campus.30 5 A cam-
pus enabler coordinates all services to disabled students and helps each
student receive the services he or she needs.30 6 These services usually
include: assisting with registration; relocating classes scheduled in in-
accessible facilities; paying readers, interpreters, note takers, and other
personnel; counseling; and providing specialized equipment.3 7
The primary difficulty with the legislation is that it allocates funds
based on total student enrollment.308 In recent years, total student en-
rollment has decreased while disabled student enrollment has in-
creased.30 9 This practice has resulted in inadequate funding for
disabled student service programs and has spurred the community col-
lege system to request a change in the funding base and an increase in
303. Id
304. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 275 (A.B. 77).
305. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 84850 (West 1978).
306. CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, OPERATIONAL GUIDE-
LINE: PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDICAPPED § 2.2 (1977).
307. Id
308. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 84301 (West 1978).
309. Interview with Susan Hunter, Assistant Dean for Student Affairs, California State
Universities and Colleges, in Long Beach, California (Jan. 19, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Hunter Interview].
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allocations.310
2. Other Programs in Higher Education
Neither the California State University and College system (CSUC)
nor the University of California system (UC) has received the substan-
tial funding provided to the community colleges under Assembly Bill
77.31 For the year 1978-1979, the CSUC system received approxi-
mately $475,000 in state funds for disabled student service programs
and an additional $500,000 for the removal of architectural barriers.3 1 2
Both the CSUC and UC systems have been forced to rely on the Cali-
fornia Department of Rehabilitation, federal and state grants, and a
variety of other sources to provide their students with the services they
require. Both systems requested substantial increases in funding for
the 1979-1980 fiscal year,3 13 and these funds have been allocated.3 14
3. Legislative Response
In 1974, the California legislature passed a resolution calling upon
the various state systems of public higher education to develop plans to
correct the underrepresentation of women, ethnic, and racial minorities
in their student populations.1 I In 1976, a similar resolution, Assembly
Concurrent Resolution 201, was passed that called for plans to over-
come the underrepresentation of disabled students.3 t6 In developing
these plans, the systems were asked to consider means of locating and
contacting prospective disabled students, alternative means of assessing
the "student potential" of disabled students, new methods for provid-
ing financial assistance to these students, and improving counseling for
the disabled.3
1 7
Assembly Concurrent Resolution 201 requested that the California
Postsecondary Education Commission compile the plans submitted by
the various systems and transmit them to the legislature with com-
ments.3 18 On June 12, 1978, the Commission adopted a final report to
310. Id
311. See CPEC PLAN, supra note 219, at 6.
312. See PROGRAM CHANGE PROPOSAL, supra note 217, at I.
313. Hunter Interview, supra note 309.
314. See 1979 Cal. Stats., § 2 Item 346 (Univ. of California); Id., Items 359, 359.1 (Cali-
fornia Univ. & State Colleges); Id., Item 364 (California Community Colleges). See also
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 84730 (West. 1979).
315. Assembly Con. Res. 151 (1974).
316. 1976 Cal. Stats., res. ch. 158.
317. Id
318. Id
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accompany these plans.319 The report emphasized that the plans for
complying with Assembly Concurrent Resolution 201 should reflect a
strong commitment to the fullest possible integration of disabled stu-
dents into the regular academic program.320 The report also suggested
that each system of higher education should include a systemwide coor-
dinator, a program coordinator for each campus, support staff, and an
advisory committee representing students with a variety of different
disabilities in its program.32'
V. CONCLUSION
In practice, little has changed with regard to providing appropriate
education for disabled students at the elementary and secondary levels.
The implementation of the Master Plan in California has reduced the
outright exclusion of disabled students in those few areas in which it
has been implemented, but exclusion remains a problem in non-Master
Plan districts. Although segregation of disabled students is a counter-
productive and outmoded procedure,322 the attempted implementation
of mainstreaming has been markedly unsuccessful. While procedural
safeguards have been established, there are many serious problems that
render these procedures ineffective.
These problems are partly attributable to the fact that the nondis-
abled often are apprehensive when dealing with the disabled 32 3 and the
existence of a separate special education system gives teachers and
school administrators an opportunity to avoid the issue. At the same
time, special educators resist reforms that might lessen their prestige or
threaten their careers. Section 504 and the Education of All Handi-
capped Children Act are well-intentioned attempts to bring about laud-
able and comprehensive changes in education for the disabled. But,
students, parents, and courts will have to be vigilant in enforcing both
the spirit and the letter of the law. Otherwise, the attitudes of the non-
disabled and the inherent nature of the special education system will
continue to prevent meaningful change. In short, educators must sup-
press their misgivings and personal interests in order to give the new
system a chance to succeed.
319. CPEC PLAN, supra note 219.
320. Id at 3.
321. Id at 7.
322. Id at 2.
323. "Handicapped people are members of a minority group that inspires not merely
sympathy but fear, guilt, terror, and superstition. It is the one minority group that you or I
could join at a moments notice." Is the Constitution Handicapped supra note 47, at 52
(quoting Bethel, Wheelchair Justice, 8 THE WASH. MONTHLY 51, 53 (1976)).
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With respect to postsecondary education, the Davis decision states
that physical ability may be considered and that, beyond a certain
level, affirmative conduct is not required by the educational institution.
However, the decision does not consider other major issues. An obvi-
ous problem still unresolved is funding. On its face, section 504 ap-
pears to make its provisions mandatory for any state that wishes to
receive federal funding. But, the federal government has not appropri-
ated any funding to assist states in the implementation of section 504.
Even if Congress were to authorize and appropriate adequate funding
for section 504 during the 1979 session, such funds would not begin to
be available to the states until the beginning of the following fiscal year
in October 1980.
This time lag presents two problems. First, the regulations under
section 504 require that all aspects of compliance, including the re-
moval of architectural barriers, be completed by June 1980. Second, if
the federal government does not provide any funding for section 504,
that fact may not be finally apparent in time for states to make appro-
priate modifications in their budgets to cover compliance costs. The
only feasible solution to the problem is for the states to proceed on the
assumption that no federal funding will be available. However, the
states are reluctant to take this approach since this attitude might dis-
courage the federal government from shouldering the burden of fund-
ing compliance under section 504.
Thus, for practical purposes, there is a stalemate situation in which
no governmental entity wants to assume responsibility for funding the
implementation of section 504. Certainly, if the stalemate is not broken
soon, the disabled will be the ultimate losers. The federal government
must make a final determination as to which agencies are responsible
for funding compliance programs and Congress should appropriate
funds to assist these agencies in fulfilling their responsibilities under the
law. Without these actions, much of the beneficial impact of section
504 will be lost forever.
Another area of concern is that of insuring that disabled students
provide input regarding the operation of their educational program.
Section 504 requires that disabled students be involved in the formula-
tion of self-evaluation and transition plans.3 4 In California, the Post-
secondary Education Commission report on Assembly Concurrent
Resolution 201 also recommends that advisory committees be estab-
lished with disabled students as members.32 5 Even though section 504
324. 45 C.F.R. § 84.6(c) (1977).
325. See CPEC PLAN, supra note 219, at 7.
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mandates this participation and Assembly Concurrent Resolution 201
recommends it, this aspect of the program has been ignored.326 Partici-
pation by handicapped students is important at the elementary and sec-
ondary level and is even more important in postsecondary education.
These students are adults and should, ultimately, have some choice in
the nature and design of the programs established to serve them.
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326. See DSC Position Paper, supra note 9, at 2.
327. See CPEC PLAN, supra note 219, at 3. One of the best examples of consumer organi-
zation participation in postsecondary education is provided by the statewide Disabled Stu-
dents Coalition (DSC). The DSC has worked closely with college and university
administrators and has achieved considerable success in improving conditions for disabled
students in higher education since its inception in 1972. Letter from Glenn S. Dumke,
Chancellor, California State Universities and Colleges to Lisa Coyne, Southern Co-
Chairperson DSC (Oct. 31, 1978).
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